What Percentage of World Oil Passes Through the Strait of Hormuz?
The short answer is roughly 20% of global oil and about a third of seaborne LNG. Here is the exact breakdown by exporter, by destination, and by alternative pipeline capacity.
Short answer: roughly 20% of global oil consumption and about 30% of seaborne liquefied natural gas pass through the Strait of Hormuz on a typical day. The rest of this article breaks that figure down — by exporter, by destination, and by what pipelines can actually replace if the Strait closes. For why the Strait matters geopolitically, see Strait of Hormuz: Why It's the World's Most Critical Oil Chokepoint.
The headline numbers
- ~20.5 million barrels of oil per day in liquid crude and condensate (pre-conflict average).
- ~5.5 million barrels per day in refined products on top of that.
- ~110 billion cubic meters per year of LNG, almost entirely from Qatar.
- 20.4% of total global liquid-fuel consumption, including both crude and refined products.
By exporter (typical day, pre-conflict)
| Country | Daily flow through Hormuz | % of country's exports |
|---|---|---|
| Saudi Arabia | ~6.3 mbpd | ~88% |
| Iraq | ~3.3 mbpd | ~98% |
| UAE | ~2.8 mbpd | ~78% |
| Kuwait | ~2.0 mbpd | ~100% |
| Iran | ~1.4 mbpd | ~100% |
| Qatar (LNG-equivalent) | ~1.0 mbpd oil-equivalent | ~100% |
By destination
The flow direction is overwhelmingly Asia, not Europe or North America. About 82% of Hormuz crude lands in Asia. China, India, Japan, and South Korea together take more than two-thirds of every barrel that exits the Strait. Europe takes around 12%. The United States imports very little — typically 4–6% of Hormuz volume — which is why a Strait disruption hurts US consumers via global prices rather than via direct supply loss.
What pipelines can replace if the Strait closes?
- Saudi East-West Petroline: ~5.0 mbpd capacity to Yanbu on the Red Sea.
- UAE Habshan-Fujairah: ~1.5 mbpd to the Gulf of Oman, bypassing Hormuz.
- Iraq-Turkey pipeline (Kirkuk-Ceyhan): nominally ~1.6 mbpd, but operating at a fraction of capacity in 2026.
Combined feasible bypass capacity is around 7–8 mbpd — roughly a third of normal Hormuz flow. The rest is stranded if the Strait closes, which is the structural reason a closure cannot be fully offset.
Why the percentage drifts year to year
The 20% figure is not constant. It moved between 17% (during the 2020 demand collapse) and 24% (during the post-2021 demand recovery). Three drivers:
- OPEC+ production decisions. When Saudi Arabia and the UAE add barrels, Hormuz throughput rises.
- Asian demand. Higher Chinese and Indian imports push more barrels through Hormuz because both countries source heavily from the Persian Gulf.
- US shale. When US exports rise, they substitute for some Persian Gulf barrels in Europe — modestly reducing Hormuz dependence.
How to track the live number
Throughput is estimated using satellite-derived AIS vessel tracking, port-call data, and tanker-storage indicators. We surface the daily reading on the Strait of Hormuz tracker along with the rerouted ship count and the spillover to oil prices on the Oil & Energy dashboard.
Citation-ready summary
If you need a single sentence: "Roughly one out of every five barrels of oil consumed worldwide and about one third of seaborne LNG transits the Strait of Hormuz, with no full-scale alternative available."